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A commentary on
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10.1038/ncomms8455
An increasingly common claim among cognitive psychologists is that the human mind is capable
of two fundamentally different types of processes (Evans and Stanovich, 2013): Type 1 processing
that is triggered autonomously by a stimulus and Type 2 processing that operates on a deliberate
level via workingmemory and that allows for decoupling or override from default (Type 1) outputs.
An article recently published in Nature Communications by Krajbich et al. (2015; hereafter, KBHF)
focused on the use of response time (RT) differences as evidence for these dual-process theories
(hereafter, DPT). KBHF outline how some dual-process theorists argue that if RTs are shorter for
some response (“A”) than some other response (“B”), then this supports a DPT wherein Response A
is intuitive and Response B is deliberative. Then, using economic games and intertemporal choice as
examples, KBHF go on to argue that these RT differences can be better accounted for by sequential
sampling models (SSM). Specifically, they argue that RT should increase when participants are
presented options that are hard to discriminate (e.g., between two equally preferential choices).
Thus, SSMs highlight the importance of conflict between choices as an explanation for RT
differences. KBHF conclude by strongly cautioning against the use of RT differences to support
DPTs.
In this commentary we will briefly discuss two important questions that arise from KBHF’s
important contribution: (1) Are all cases in which researchers have used RTs to support DPTs
undermined by KBHF’s analysis? and (2) Are there any RT differences that are more easily
explained under DPT than by SSMs? Our overarching goal is to illustrate that the scope of KBHF’s
analysis is far more limited than would be reasonable surmised by their original article.
ARE ALL CASES IN WHICH RESEARCHERS HAVE USED RTs TO
SUPPORT DPTs UNDERMINED BY KBHF’s ANALYSIS?
As mentioned, KBHF focus on DPTs in which responses are labeled as either “intuitive” or
“deliberative.” KBHF accurately demonstrate the problematic nature of inferring that a given
response is intuitive or deliberative based on fast or slow RTs (respectively). Indeed, in dual-process
research, this practice is known as the labeling fallacy and most commonly occurs in the domain
of normative accuracy (with logical responses assumed to be the result of Type 2 processing; e.g.,
Gibbard, 1990; Epstein, 1994). Crucially, however, this practice has been decried by dual-process
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theorists (e.g., Evans and Stanovich, 2013), who point out
that Type 1 processing can lead to correct responses and
Type 2 processing can support biased processing (Evans, 2007;
Stanovich, 2011). Unfortunately, KBHF do not mention that
there are many DPTs that do not attempt to make such claims.
For example, Evans and Stanovich (2013) have claimed that
speed and accuracy are correlated but not central factors in what
determines the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes.
This is an important addendum to KBHF because, based on their
analysis alone, it is unclear whether there is good evidence to
contend that RT differences should not be used to support any
form of DPT. They fail to mention that there are any other classes
of DPT outside of the limited class that they discuss.
ARE THERE ANY RT DIFFERENCES THAT
ARE MORE EASILY EXPLAINED UNDER
DPT THAN BY SSMs?
That KBHF only discussed one class of DPT does not mean that
other classes of DPT are necessarily immune from their criticism.
Thus, we will highlight a set of empirical results that are as easily
or perhaps evenmore easily explained under DPTs than by simple
SSMs. Our goal is to illustrate not simply that the DPT that KBHF
outlined is not representative of the broader literature, but that
there is good reason to believe that RTs can be a useful tool in
DPT research.
Recent DPTs have focused on the conflict between evidence
(or, put differently, response outputs) as a mechanism that causes
deliberation and, as a result, RT differences (De Neys, 2012, 2014;
Sloman, 2014; Handley and Trippas, 2015; Pennycook et al., 2015;
for an important predecessor, see Sloman, 1996; for an example
in the realm of cooperation, see Evans et al., 2015)1. Thus,
like SSMs, there are DPTs that focus on response competition
(manipulated experimentally) and not on labeling responses as
intuitive or deliberative. Consider, for example, research on base-
rate problems. These problems describe a conflict between the
probability of group membership based on a base-rate (e.g.,
99.5% chance that Paul is a nurse) and a set of stereotypes
that are consistent with an alternative (e.g., Paul seems more
like a doctor). The typical finding for problems of this type
is that people have a strong preference for the stereotypical
information (e.g., 81% stereotypical responses in De Neys and
Glumicic, 2008, Experiment 1). Nonetheless, for example, De
Neys and Glumicic found that participants took (roughly) 5
additional seconds to give stereotypical responses if they were
presented conflicting base-rate information (relative to non-
conflict versions of the problems). How can this RT difference be
explained?
Based on KBHF’s characterization of DPT, the conclusion
from DPT proponents would be that stereotypes are “Type 1”
responses whereas base-rates are “Type 2” responses. This,
1The underlying claim is that an increase in RT indicates a potential increase in
deliberative Type 2 processing. Notably, this is not the same as arguing that longer
RTs automatically indicate the presence of Type 2 processes (and implied absence
of Type 1 processing). That is, a relative increase in Type 2 processing should be
reflected in longer RTs, but this does not mean that the associated response was not
initially generated autonomously and intuitively.
however, is not the case. De Neys and Glumicic’s (2008) primary
comparison (with respect to RTs) was not between base-rate and
stereotypical responses, but between incongruent (conflict) and
congruent (no-conflict) problems. Specifically, they found that
participants take longer when solving problems that contain a
conflict between base-rate and stereotypes regardless of whether
they give base-rate or stereotypical responses. This finding, first
reported using RTs, was then conceptually replicated using a
wide variety of different tasks (e.g., syllogisms; conditionals; the
conjunction fallacy; and ratio bias) and additional measures (e.g.,
memory recall; verbal protocols; skin conductance response;
confidence; fMRI; and ERP; see De Neys, 2012, 2014 for
reviews). This supports the contention that the detection of
conflict between initial response outputs causesType 2 processing
(Pennycook et al., 2015).
We should note that the increase in RT as a function of
the conflict manipulation can be accommodated under SSMs.
Indeed, KBHF’s key demonstration involved a manipulation of
choice conflict. Both SSMs and DPTs predict that RT should
increase when two choices come into conflict. However, in our
view, understanding this conflict at the cognitive level implicates
dual-processing. For example Pennycook et al. (2015) argued
for a three-stage dual-process model in which conflicting initial
choice outputs (Stage 1) may be recognized as such (Stage
2), which then initiates analytic processing (Stage 3). This
goes beyond the simple observation that choice conflict causes
increased RT.
Importantly, not all patterns of data are equally easy to
accommodate under DPTs and SSMs (but see Alos-Ferrer, 2016
for a dual-process drift diffusion model). For example, although
De Neys and Glumicic (2008) found evidence for an increase in
RT for stereotypical responses to conflict vs. no-conflict problems
with extreme base-rates (e.g., 995 lawyers, 5 engineers), this effect
diminishes if base-rates are mademoderate (e.g., 700 lawyers, 300
engineers; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2015). In theory, this could
be accommodated by a SSM wherein participants experience
more conflict between stereotypical choices and extreme base-
rates than they do with moderate base-rates. Crucially, however,
manipulating the extremity of the base-rates does not have an
effect on RTs for base-rate responses to conflict problems (i.e.,
the base-rate extremity effect is only evident for stereotypical
responses; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2015).
According to Pennycook et al. (2015), this pattern of
results occurs because RT for base-rate responses is primarily
determined by cognitive decoupling—that is, the time it takes
to override the salient stereotype via Type 2 processing (the
stereotypes are identical across moderate and extreme base-
rate experiments). The stereotypical responses are fundamentally
different because at least some of the people who do not
spend much time giving stereotypical answers genuinely do not
distinguish between conflict and non-conflict problems (i.e., they
are not detecting the conflict between their stereotypical answer
and presented base-rates). Pennycook et al. (2015) argued that
the probability of this happening increases when base-rates are
made moderate relative to extreme, hence the aforementioned
pattern of results. Thus, RTs can be used in an experimental
context to distinguish between conflict detection and cognitive
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decoupling in DPTs. At the very least, evidence of RT differences
as a consequence of response conflict is not necessarily evidence
for SSMs and against DPTs.
CONCLUSION
In our opinion, there are good reasons to continue using
RTs in DPT research. We have focused on one example, but
there are other types of evidence to support this contention.
For example, Thompson and colleagues (Thompson et al.,
2011, 2013; Thompson and Johnson, 2014) found a negative
correlation between the “feeling of rightness” associated with
an initial response (e.g., stereotypical responses for base-rate
problems) and the amount of time spent reasoning when giving a
final answer. This finding indicates that metacognitive processes
are an important determinant of how much Type 2 processing
will be engaged for any given sort of problem. In a different
realm altogether, there is evidence that religious believers are less
analytic (see Pennycook et al., 2016) and, as a consequence, spend
less time when presented with reasoning problems (Pennycook
et al., 2013, 2014). These findings were predicted by DPTs, which
indicates that the framework has been useful for generating
hypotheses to be tested using RTs.
Dual-process theory has proven to be quite popular among
psychologists. Naturally, however, not all applications of DPT are
created equal. Dual-process research that relies on experimental
manipulations and that is not focused on making claims about
whether responses are purely “intuitive” or “analytic” are (at least)
on the same footing as other decision making models. Further,
empirical work that teases apart the cognitive mechanisms that
explain why decisions slow in the face of conflicting evidence
is required, but in our view DPTs are in a strong position to
facilitate this research.
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